This study explores the relationships between firm performance and the incentive and entrenchment effects of corporate governance structures. It analyzes whether the benefits of providing stock ownership to directors are greater than the potential costs of entrenching officers and directors. Using the dollar amount of stock owned by various classes of directors, the results suggest that the incentive effect dominates any costs related to entrenchment: firms with greater stock ownership outperform other firms, regardless of the degree of managerial entrenchment that may be present. This result is robust to firm size, growth opportunities, time period, and other controls. The implication for policymakers is that providing directors with incentives through stock ownership remains a very effective corporate governance mechanism.
Introduction
Over the past ten years, corporate governance has come under considerable scrutiny due to corporate failures such Enron, to investor frauds such as Bernie Madoff, and to systemic panics such as the global financial crisis.
Regulators, practitioners, and academics have been searching for ways to improve the relationship between managers of firms and the ultimate stakeholders, in hopes of finding a "best" corporate governance structure. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 in the United States, and it stipulated new requirements for independent audits and new responsibilities for boards of directors. The major U.S. stock exchanges required listed firms to have a majority of independent directors in 2003, moving all firms towards a standard corporate governance structure. "Say on Pay" practices are widespread in Europe and are becoming more common in the U.S., allowing shareholders more input into the corporate governance process. And, in the wake of the U.S. financial crisis, regulators are considering a broad range of new initiatives, such as limiting executive compensation and outlining new requirements for boards of directors 124 . 124 In May 2009, U.S. senators Charles Schumer and Maria Cantwell introduced a -Shareholder Bill of Rights.‖ Among other items, this -Bill‖ would require firms having ‗Say-onPay' measures, having an independent board chair, and eliminating classified boards. See
All of these initiatives presuppose that there is an optimal corporate governance structure. Policies attempting to regulate and standardize how firms and their corporate governance environments are structured are intended to improve shareholder rights and to improve the agency costs inherent in the corporate form. If there is one structure that is indeed optimal, then all firms should (would) move towards it. Prior academic literature has focused on the ownership of the firm. In theory, if the managers own 100% of the firm then there is no agency conflict. When managers own less than 100%, which is the case in most if not all public corporations, agency conflicts arise. The goal of any corporate governance policies should be to minimize these agency conflicts and, thus, to maximize the benefits to external stakeholders.
While firm ownership has been the primary focus of the academic literature, recent work has moved beyond ownership to explore whether or not there can be an optimal corporate governance structure. In general, the research suggests that there is no single "best" model for corporate governance that can be applied to all firms 125 . In general, the work analyzing complex indices composed of many corporate governance factors have failed to show that these http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=3134 68.. 125 See, for example, Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2006), Wintoki (2007) , and Bhagat, Bolton and Romano (2008) .
indices can measure the quality of a firm"s corporate governance environment. Each firm is a unique and nuanced set of factors, preferences, and incentives. As such, it makes sense that complex indices do not seem to be reliable measures of the complete environment. In equilibrium, each firm should choose its structure and unique features because they are optimal for that firm. In this sense, it is possible that the quality of a firm"s corporate governance environment may best be measured by concentrating on individual characteristics.
With this in mind, recent strands of the literature have focused on two firm characteristics that should be directly related: director ownership and officer entrenchment. Providing directors with the same incentives as common stockholders should better align the interests of the principals and agents, but allowing the officers and directors to become too entrenched might impose significant costs on shareholders. In their seminal work, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) identified this inherent conflict. They found that firm value increases when officers and directors have some incentives, but value decreases when they own "too much," presumably because they become too entrenched and are not necessarily always representing the interests of shareholders.
Previously, most of the corporate governance research has focused on these two effects separately. The purpose of this paper is to directly compare the potential benefits of directors owning common stock with the potential costs of officers and directors becoming too entrenched. That is, it directly compares the incentive effect with the entrenchment effect. Firms do not necessarily choose whether the directors have incentives or are entrenched. In most firms, both effects will be present: there will be incentives provided to directors -through compensation, stock ownership, or non-monetary benefits -and there will be a certain amount of entrenchment -through tenure, charter provisions, or organizational structure. The effects are not mutually exclusive. There will be trade-offs between these two effects. This study attempts to identify how these trade-offs ultimately effect firm performance and firm value. The primary research question in this study is which governance mechanism is more dominant in large U.S. firms: director ownership or management entrenchment? It is possible that the incentive-related benefits of director ownership dominate the negative effects of entrenched mangers; likewise, the opposite is possible. By directly comparing these two effects, and by considering any dynamic interactive effects between the two variables, this study will attempt to clarify how each of these factors influences a firm"s performance.
Using the dollar value of stockholdings owned by various classes of directors as the measure of the incentive effect, and using two different measures of entrenchment -the G-Index from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and whether or not the CEO is also the chair -the results suggest that the incentive effect dominates.
In a variety of specifications and methodological approaches, director ownership is almost universally associated with better firm performance and with higher firm value, while the entrenchment measures rarely have any significant effect on either performance or value. This result is robust to a number of different specifications, approaches, and controls.
It is economically significant, as well. This suggests that the benefits of providing directors and officers with the appropriate incentives outweigh the potential costs associated with directors and officers becoming entrenched. Firms that have greater ownership by directors outperform those with lower ownership, regardless of any institutional costs of entrenchment.
This result suggests that efforts to improve corporate governance should focus on ways to increase stock ownership by directors to better align their incentives with the incentives of the firm"s stakeholders.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature review and the motivation for this study. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and their implications. And, Section 6 concludes.
Motivation
The study of corporate ownership forms has a long history in the corporate finance literature. Berle and Means (1932) were among the first to recognize the inherent conflict between the owners of a corporation and the managers of the managers of that corporation. They warned that too much power in the hands of managers, or a board of directors that is controlled by the managers, could present serious problems. This conflict between principals and agents was further elucidated 40 years later by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , who showed that agents acting in their own rational self-interest might not always be acting in the owners" best interest. The solution to this conflict was to better align the interests of agents and principals, which might be best addressed by giving the mangers of the firm ownership of the firm. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) studied this empirically and found that firm value -and, therefore, shareholder value -does indeed increase when the managers and directors own up to 5% of the outstanding common stock. However, this benefit is not monotonic: value decreases when managers own between 5% and 20% of the firm, but increases again at ownership levels greater than 20%. The benefit to firm value suggests that there is an incentive effect to managerial ownership; the detrimental effect at certain levels of ownership suggests that too much ownership can entrench managers and directors. The purpose of this study is to compare these incentive effects and entrenchment effects. Using the most recent standards for measuring ownership and entrenchment, the effects that each has on firm and shareholder value are analyzed.
In studying firm ownership, the corporate governance literature has identified countless measures of ownership. As mentioned above, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) This study relies on the approach taken in and considers the dollar value of stock ownership of various classes of directors. The argument for focusing on dollar value of ownership rather than percentage ownership is simple. Imagine two directors of different companies. Director A owns a 0.10% stake in a $1 billion firm; Director B owns a 1.00% stake in a $100 million firm. The value of each stake is exactly $1,000,000. As rational economic agents, both directors have the same incentives. Thus, we would expect both directors to devote the same time and expertise to their work. If we focused on the percentage ownership, we would say that Director B has greater incentives, which is likely not the case. consider only the median director because that individual may have the swing vote; the current study will consider this variable and two other variations of it.
While ownership by officers and directors is observable, entrenchment is not. As such, researchers have had to use a number of proxies to measure entrenchment, with varying levels of effectiveness. Jensen (1993) argues that it is important to separate the roles of CEO and board chair positions. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) take a similar perspective, but advocate appointing an independent lead director. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (GIM, 2003) take a more general, firm-wide view of entrenchment. They analyze the relationship between firm value and an equallyweighted index of 24 corporate charter provisions and find that firms with fewer provisions, or fewer restrictions, have higher Tobin"s Q and stock returns. Core, Guay and Rusticus (2007) show that GIM"s GIndex is also associated with superior operating performance. And, most recently, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) show that a specific subset of 6 of the 24 provisions in the GIM G-Index are the only provisions that matter. They create an Entrenchment Index made up of these 6 provisions, and show that they alone are responsible for the superior valuations observed by GIM. Regardless of the measure, the story is the same: entrenchment is harmful and poses a significant cost to shareholders.
The purpose of this study is to compare the costs and benefits of these two effects: incentive alignment and entrenchment. Firms do not choose one effect over the other. All firms have some degree of incentive alignment and all firms have some degree of entrenchment. Using the latest measures of incentive alignment and entrenchment -director ownership and the GIM G-Index -I compare these two effects to see which dominates (if either does). Ex ante, either effect could dominate. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) observed that the incentive effect dominates at lower and higher levels of ownership, while the entrenchment effect dominates at moderate levels of ownership. In fact, by studying the two effects simultaneously, it is possible that they cancel each other out. As Wintoki (2007) explains, a firm"s corporate governance environment is both nuanced and unobservable. If, as he suggests, each firm has a unique, but different, optimal corporate governance structure, we might actually expect to see the two effects cancel each other out.
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Because it is impossible to actually observe the costs and benefits of corporate structures and corporate governance, empirically estimating these relationships is the best way to better understand the relevant dynamics.
Data and Methodology
The primary database for this study is who use the stock ownership of the median director because they believe it is the best measure of incentive alignment. This study adds the two measure of independent director ownership to explicitly contrast the measures of entrenchment. Of all directors, the independent directors should be the least entrenched because their only tie to the firm is through their board duties. Thus, their ownership incentives should work to directly offset any institutional entrenchment in the firm. 129 FirmSize is the natural log of total assets. Leverage is the firm"s long-term debt to assets ratio. CEOOwnership is the percentage of stock owned by the CEO. MarketBook is the firm"s market value of equity to book value of equity ratio 130 . Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm"s stock returns over the preceding 60 months.
131
And finally, two other measures of corporate governance are used: BoardSize is the number of directors on the board, and Independence is the percentage of directors who are neither employees nor related to the firm in some manner.
132 All regressions also include intercepts and year dummy variables, and standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level (Petersen, 2005) .
However, as discussed above, while they may be able to control the degrees, firms do not choose 128 As is suggested in Table 1 , insider directors own more stock than independent directors. On average, CEOs own about $18 million in common stock. However, if we focus on CEO dollar ownership rather than independent director ownership, it may be difficult to distinguish between the incentive and entrenchment effects. That is, the CEO may actually be entrenched by the size of their ownership stakes. 129 The correlation between the GIM G-Index and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell's (2009) Entrenchment Index is over 0.70. As such, the results from using the Entrenchment Index are qualitatively very similar to using the G-Index. 130 MarketBook and Tobin"s Q are mechanically similar variables. However, Table 2 shows that their correlation is very low. Even so, all regressions on Tobin"s Q are performed without MarketBook as a control, and the results are qualitatively similar. 131 If 60 months of data is not available, a minimum of 36 months is used. 132 Including 4 different measures of governance as explanatory and control variables raises the concern of multicollinearity. Table 2 shows that the correlations across the different governance variables are relatively low, with all coefficients less than 0.30. In all cases, the variance inflation factors are less than 6, suggesting than multicollinearity is not a serious concern.
between having incentive effects and entrenchment effects; all firms have both effects, to some extent. Thus, it is possible that the two effects work in combination with each other. If the combination is indeed the dominant effect, then it would be the interaction of the two effects, rather than either effect independent of the other, that would be dominating the corporate governance environment. To investigate this possibility, equation (1) Since both DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment are continuous variables (except for CEO Duality), the coefficients on the interactive terms may be difficult to interpret. Thus, indicator variables are created to identify "good" levels of DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment. For the DirectorOwnership variables, if the amount of ownership is greater than the sample median, it is defined as "good" and the indicator variable is equal to 1; if the amount of ownership is less than the sample median, the indicator is equal to 0. Similarly, if the G-Index score is less than the sample median, it is considered "good" and the indicator variable is equal to 1; if the G-Index score is more than the sample median, the indicator variable is equal to 0. For CEO Duality, which is already an indicator variable, the scores are reversed to be consistent with the other definitions of "good" governance; that is, if the CEO is also the board chair, then the indicator variable is equal to 0; it is equal to 1, otherwise. If the effects of DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment only work in combination with each other, then we would expect to see a significant coefficient on the interactive terms but not on the individual governance variables.
It is also possible that firms may be uniquely different based on certain characteristics. If so, we may expect to observe different relationships between Performance, DirectorOwnership, and Performance for different types of firms. To investigate the possibility that various firm characteristics may be driving the results, the above analyses are performed on sub-samples sorted based on FirmSize, MarketBook and Independence. As is shown in Table 2 , there is a small positive correlation between the size of the firm and director ownership. It is possible that larger, more mature firms have more well-established incentive policies that are much different than those of smaller firms (restricted stock grants instead of stock option grants, for example). Similarly, a firm"s growth opportunities may influence its corporate governance environment. More mature firms with fewer growth opportunities may feel the need to entrench directors and officers because they cannot compensate them through additional incentives related to growth. And, because board independence has been such a focus of both corporate and regulatory initiatives 133 , it is possible that Independence is a dominating characteristic. Independence increased from about 60% in 1998 to about 70% in 2007. As board independence has become a focus of corporate governance for firms, it may control the firms" structures with respect to DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment.
Thus, studying the relationships between DirectorOwnership, Entrenchment and Performance at different levels of Independence is necessary. Equation (1) is estimated on each quartile to assess the impact the firm differences have on the incentive and entrenchment effect relationships.
Finally, to see if the results are time specific, the above analyses are performed by year. The 1998-2007 time period has been a unique period with respect to corporate governance, during which we observed many high-profile corporate governance failures, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, and governance regulations mandated by the major U.S. stock exchanges. It is possible that individuals" and firms" attitudes with respect to various corporate governance mechanisms have changed over time. If so, we might expect to see the relationships from the above analyses change over time. Equation (1) is estimated by year to assess how consistent these relationships are over time.
Ex ante, the expected results are uncertain. From Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and others, we know that greater director and officer stock ownership can lead to greater firm performance and value. From Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and others, we know that firms with entrenched directors and officers experience lower firm performance and value. But, we do now know how these two effects necessarily work in combination with each other. And that is precisely the purpose of this study: to uncover whether the incentive effect and the entrenchment effect work together, if they offset each other, or if one effect dominates the other.
4.
Results Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample in Panel A, with sub-samples sorted based on the dollar value of the median director"s ownership stake and the GIM G-Index in Panels B and C. In Panel A, we note that the median director owns stock worth approximately $900,000. The median independent director owns stock worth approximately $500,000 and the sum of the holdings of all 133 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required firms to have an audit committee comprised entirely of independent directors. In November 2003, both the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ issued regulations requiring all listed firms to have a majority of independent directors on their board.. independent directors is $5.7 million. 134 Based on the G-Index, the average firm has about 9 (out of 24) antitakeover provisions. The sample firms are generally larger firms, with about 9 board members, 6 of whom are independent. The CEO is also the board chair in about 60% of the firms. The Performance and control variables are comparable to other similar studies for this time period.
In Panel B we see that there are noticeable differences between the types of firms with low director ownership and those with high director ownership. Directors have greater stock ownership in larger firms, in firms with less debt, in firms with higher growth opportunities and in better performing firms. Firms with more independent boards also have directors with large stakes, which is interesting considering that CEOs and chairs frequently have the largest ownership stakes. We see similarly interesting relationships in Panel C where the sample is divided into quartiles based on GIM G-Index. Larger firms, more levered firms, firms with larger boards, firms with more independent boards and less volatile firms appear to be more entrenched as they have higher GIM G-Index scores. Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for the primary variables. With the exception of the director ownership variables which should be highly correlated by construction, there are few correlations greater than 0.20. The DirectorOwnership variables do not appear to be systematically correlated with either the Performance variables or the control variables. Similarly, the two Entrenchment variables appear to be uncorrelated with the other primary variables.
Untabulated analysis of the variance inflation factors suggests that multi-collinearity is not a serious concern in this analysis.
The primary relationship that is analyzed is from equation (1) . The results from estimating equation (1) However, it is possible that these two effects impact firms through some combination of the effects. To control for this, equation (2) 
is assigned a value of 1; firms with DirectorOwnership less than the median are assigned a value of 0. If the firm"s G-Index is less than the sample median, it is assigned a 1, and if the CEO and chair positions are separate, the firm is assigned a 1. This applies a structure such that all measures of "good" governance have a value of 1 and measures of "weak" governance have a value of 0. Three variations of interactive terms are considered: dummy for DirectorOwnership with continuous value of Entrenchment, dummy for Entrenchment with continuous value of DirectorOwnership, and dummy variables for both effects. In Panel A we see that DirectorOwnership is still positively and significantly related to ROA while Entrenchment is not. These results generally persist in Panels B and C under different specifications. The interaction term in Panel A includes the continuous value of DirectorOwnership interacted with whether or not Entrenchment is better than the median; in all specifications, the interaction term is not significant. This suggests that "good" levels of Entrenchment are not critical to leading to better firm performance through director ownership. In Panel B, the interaction term includes the continuous value of Entrenchment and an indicator variable for whether or not the firm has "good" levels of director ownership. In this case, the interaction term is negative and significant in all specifications. Because the continuous measures of Entrenchment are descending variables, this suggests that "good" DirectorOwnership combined with better levels of Entrenchment do lead to superior performance. Taken with Panel A, this suggests that the DirectorOwnership effect dominates the Entrenchment effect. Finally, in Panel C the interaction term includes the two indicator variables. When DirectorOwnership is "good" and Entrenchment is "good," the firm experiences better operating performance, suggesting that analyzing the 136 The results using Tobin"s Q as the dependent variable measure of Performance are qualitatively very similar to those for ROA and are available upon request.
two effects in combination with each other can provide important inferences.
It is possible that certain other firm characteristics may influence a firm"s corporate governance structure, and thus may influence the relationships between DirectorOwnership, Entrenchment and Performance. To allow for this possibility, equation (1) is estimated by quartiles based on three different firm characteristics: firm size, market-to-book ratio, and independence of board directors.
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Because the number of possible combinations of variables is extremely large, this section only focuses on two governance variables: Median Director Stock Ownership and GIM G-Index. In Panel A, we see that FirmSize does not seem to affect the results from Table 3 : higher levels of DirectorOwnership lead to superior ROA for firms of all size, while the negative effects of Entrenchment do not seem to adversely affect the firm"s operating performance, regardless of firm size. Similarly, neither a firm"s growth opportunities, measured through MarketBook, nor the Independence of the board seem to affect this relationship. In Panel B, these relationships to persist when Tobin's Q is the measure of Performance: higher levels of stock ownership by directors lead to superior firm valuations, while higher G-Index scores do not adversely affect performance, regardless of the size of the firm, its growth opportunities, or the relative independence of its board members. In untabulated analyses, the findings from using the other measures of DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment are qualitatively similar.
The final analysis considers the results with respect to the sample time period. It is possible that the relationships identified above are time varying. The sample years, 1998-2007, were certainly a time of heightened sensitivity on firms" corporate governance environments, and these relationships may have changed during this period. To allow for this possibility, equation (1) is estimated by year for the relationship between Median Director Stock Ownership and GIM G-Index. In addition, Fama and MacBeth (1973) analyses are performed over the 10-year period. Again, we see the primary results persist when we focus on the analyses on a year-by-year basis. With the exception of 1999, DirectorOwnership is positively and significantly related to superior ROA; in all 10 years it is positively and significantly related to Tobin's Q. The Entrenchment variable -GIM GIndex -is not significantly related to either measure of firm Performance in any of the 10 years (in 2007, the p-value in the Tobin's Q equation is 0.0502). Given that the sample sizes are much smaller in several years, 137 The only reason for estimating equation (1) rather than equation (2) is for conciseness. In untabulated results, including the interactive term in the firm characteristics regressions does not qualitatively alter the results. All untabulated results are available upon request.
the strength of the DirectorOwnership result is striking. Finally, a Fama-MacBeth (1973) analysis is performed on the annual coefficients on DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment to determine the relative constancy of the relationships. Again, the Fama-MacBeth coefficient for DirectorOwnerhip is positive and significantly related to both measures of Performance, despite only having a sample size of 10 years. The coefficient for Entrenchment is not significantly related to either measure of Performance. Of course, this could be due low power of only having a 10-year sample period (or the low power within each year), but the result is nonetheless consistent with all prior analyses.
Sensitivity Tests
In untabulated results, we consider a variety of issues which may be driving or complicating the above results, as well as some alternative specifications. First, to address the possibility that earnings management may be driving the results including operating income, we include a measure of abnormal accruals using the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). When a measure of non-discretionary accruals is included in the models, this variable is usually insignificant and its inclusion does not qualitatively alter the results related to the DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment variables. Next, to address the possibility that our DirectorOwnership variables are merely a mechanical result of better past performance leading to higher stock prices, which leads to greater ownership, a variable for past stock return is included as an explanatory variable. Again, while this variable is periodically positively associated with better firm performance, its inclusion does not alter the main predictions concerning the DirectorOwnership and Entrenchment variables.
The analysis in Table 6 considers the relationship between Performance and the two governance effects for each of the 10 years in the study. In further tests, rather than considering each year individually, two sub-periods are considered: 
Discussion
The primary finding of this study is that providing boards of directors with properly aligned incentives through the use of stock ownership leads to better firm performance and higher firm values. This benefit exists despite any potential costs associated with managers and directors being too entrenched to function in the shareholders" interests. This is a novel finding, and has significant implications for both future corporate governance regulation and research. First, it suggests that regulators should proceed with caution in attempting to mandate standardized corporate governance regulations. While there have certainly been notable corporate failures that are likely due to some degree of corporate governance failuresuch as Enron and Lehman Brothers -in equilibrium, firms should and do appear to understand that shareholders are better off when directors have the proper incentives to act on their behalf. Second, it suggests prior results showing the significance of entrenched officers and directors may be overstated. That result largely disappears when DirectorOwnership is included as a control. Finally, these results show the importance of considering the dollar value of stock ownership of officers and directors as a corporate governance mechanism. When the incentives of officers and directors are best aligned with those of outside shareholders, firms perform better. This is not to say that other measures of corporate governance should not be considered; but, it does suggest that director ownership is an essential element of any firm"s corporate governance environment.
As an econometric study, these findings are limited to the statistical construct and to the interpretations. While certain relationships have been identified as statistically significant, of more importance to practitioners and regulators (and possibly even academics) is whether or not these results are economically significant. It seems that they are. Measuring the elasticity of effects at the means, a 1.00% increase in Median Director Ownership leads to a 0.33% increase in Return on Assets and a 1.65% increase in Tobin's Q (using the analysis in Table 3 ). This is quite meaningful as it suggests that increasing Median Director Ownership by less than $10,000 can yield substantial benefits to shareholders. In contrast, a 1.00% increase in the G-Index leads to a 0.10% decrease in Return on Assets and a 0.14% decrease in Tobin's Q. Small efforts to improve the incentives to directors seem to provide benefits that far outweigh any associated costs related to directors becoming too entrenched.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to directly compare the benefits associated with providing properly aligned incentives to directors with the costs of directors and managers becoming entrenched. Prior research has identified managing these two corporate governance effects as critical to providing returns to suppliers of capital. The primary research purpose of this study was to identify how incentives and entrenchment affect the performance of firms, and to assess whether one effect dominates the other. The results from this study clearly suggest that the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect. That is, the benefits to firm performance and firm value associated with directors owning more stock seem to outweigh the costs of systematic entrenchment by the boards of directors or executive officers. This result is robust to a number of control variables, specifications and time periods.
Further, this result is economically significant. From a policy perspective, this suggests that efforts to improve corporate governance environments by mandating shareholder access or board structure may be misguided. Providing directors and managers with greater stockholdings may make them more entrenched, but the benefits of these agents having their incentives at least partially aligned with those of external suppliers of capital seem to far outweigh any costs associated with entrenchment. From an academic research perspective, this suggests that the dollar value of stock owned by directors should continue to be a proxy for governance. And, from a practitioner perspective, this suggests that efforts to improve corporate governance relationships between firms and their stakeholders should focus on providing the board of directors with properly aligned incentives through greater stock ownership. The benefits seem to far outweigh the costs and shareholders seem to be better off because of it.
Appendix A: Description of Variables

Median Director Own
The natural log of the dollar value of common stock held by the median director on the board. If the board has an even number of directors, then the average of the two middle directors is used.
Median Outsider Own
The natural log of the dollar value of common stock held by the median independent director on the board. If the board has an even number of independent directors, then the average of the two middle directors is used.
All Outsiders Own
The natural log of the dollar value of common stock held by all independent directors on the board.
GIM G-Index
From Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), this is the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions in place at the firm (0 to 24 scale)
CEO Duality
Equal to 1 if the CEO also serves as the board chair, 0 otherwise
Board Size
The number of directors on the board
Independence
The percentage of directors on the board who are independent of the firm; that is, those directors who are neither employees of the firm or linked to the firm in some way (former employee, consultant, counsel, etc.)
DumOwnership
Equal to 1 if director ownership is greater than the sample median; 0 otherwise DumEntrenchment Equal to 1 if the GIM G-Index is less than the sample median, 0 otherwise; or, equal to 1 if CEO Duality is equal to 0, 0 otherwise ROA Operating income before depreciation to total assets ratio Q Tobin's Q -Market value of assets to book value of assets ratio
Industry Performance
The average ROA or Tobin's Q for all firms in the sample firm's 4-digit SIC code, excluding the sample firm
Firm Size
The natural log of the total assets of the firm
Leverage
The ratio of long-term debt to assets CEO % Ownership The percentage of common stock owned by the CEO
Market Book
The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity
Volatility
The standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the preceding 36-60 months FirmSize Firms <---------------------------- 
Low FirmSize Firms <-----------------------------> High
